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 A Series of Unfortunate Events: The Growth, Decline and 
Rebirth of Ottawa’s Entrepreneurial Institutions 
 
Running title: Crisis & Entrepreneurial Institutions in Ottawa 
 
Ben Spigel 
Department of Geography and Program in Planning, University of Toronto 
ben.spigel@utoronto.ca 
 
Purpose - This chapter examines how informal and formal entrepreneurial institutions are 
influenced by economic crises. These institutions act as the foundation for many, if not all,  
entrepreneurial activities, but they are highly vulnerable to change during times of crisis.   
 
Design/methodology/approach - This chapter uses a case study of software entrepreneurs 
in Ottawa, Canada to better understand the influence of the 2001 and 2008 recessions on 
the social and economic aspects of entrepreneurship. This is case is examined through a set 
of thirty-nine semi-structured interviews with entrepreneurs, investors, and economic 
development officers.  
 
Findings - While informal entrepreneurial institutions have adapted to a changing 
economic environment, formal institutions and government programs have so far failed to 
do this. This results in less effective entrepreneurship support programs.  
 
Research limitations/implications - As with other qualitative case studies, these findings are 
not generalizable to other regions. This chapter argues that further research is needed to 
better understand the social forces behind institutional change.  
 
Practical implications - This chapter argues that entrepreneurship support programs must 
be customized to the informal social institutions that underlie all entrepreneurial behavior 
and practices. This alignment potentially increases the usefulness of such programs to 
entrepreneurs.  
 
Originality/value - While entrepreneurship in Ottawa has been carefully studied, there has 
been very little work examining how technology entrepreneurship in Ottawa has fared 
after the decline of the telecommunications market. This chapter is useful to both 
entrepreneurship scholars as well as practitioners and policy makers interested in how 
entrepreneurial institutions react to crises.  
 
Keywords: institutions, technology entrepreneurship, economic geography, case studies, 
qualitative methods  
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 Far from being an individual pursuit, entrepreneurship takes place in a complex 
and overlapping web of economic, legal, and social institutions. Entrepreneurs carry out 
both their day to day activities as well as their long-term strategies within these 
institutional assemblages. Some particular institutional arrangements can promote the 
formation and growth of small firms, while others discourage it. Policy makers and 
entrepreneurship scholars have shown an intense interest in studying successful 
institutional mixtures to understand both their origin as well as and how they can be 
transplanted to other regions (Julien, 2007). The particular institutional mixes that 
encourage experimentation and knowledge sharing in regions like Silicon Valley are key 
ingredients in these cities' continued entrepreneurial and economic successes (Baharmi and 
Evans, 1995; Nelles, Bramwell, and Wolfe 2005; Saxenian, 1994). Others have blamed 
institutional mixes that discourage risk taking for low regional entrepreneurship rates 
(Malecki, 2009).  
 However, within the existing literature, institutions are seen as largely static entities 
that affect economic and social interactions while remaining outside their influence. This 
cannot be further from the truth. Like all social phenomena, institutions are continuously 
in a state of flux and change. Institutions are particularly vulnerable to economic shocks 
and crises, but we have very little understanding of how crises affect entrepreneurial 
institutions. Economic downturns can suppress inter-firm cooperation or innovation as 
companies desperately try to stay afloat . But, shocks can also lead to positive outcomes, as 
actors realize that existing informal and formal institutions are counterproductive and 
begin to create new ones. A static perception of institutional mixtures makes it harder to 
understand how economic crises affect regional economies; institutional changes will far 
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outlast temporary economic discontinuities. Policies not attuned to local institutional 
mixtures will inevitably fail. This is especially true for entrepreneurship policies, which 
depend on the presence of local informal institutions to help promote risk taking and 
innovativeness. Policies must build on existing institutions if they are to successfully 
promote regional entrepreneurship and growth.  
 This chapter examines the influence of economic crises on entrepreneurial 
institutions through the case of Ottawa, Ontario. This once sleepy government town was 
transformed in the 1970s and 1980s into a high-tech hub of telecommunications 
entrepreneurship. However, the crash of the internet bubble in 2001 and the subsequent 
decline in venture capital (VC) led to a fundamental shift in the region’s entrepreneurial 
institutions. These institutions were further damaged by the 2008 financial crisis, which 
while less severe than the crisis in the US, still had a profound affect on Ottawa's 
technology economy. While subsequent generations of entrepreneurs have largely adapted 
to these changes, government policies and formal institutions have not.  
 In the next section, I discus the role of institutions and their place in the 
entrepreneurship process. Following that, I examine Ottawa’s history high-tech 
entrepreneurship, from its origins in government research labs in the 1940s to the rise and 
fall of its telecommunications industry. Using a dataset consisting of semi-structured 
interviews with thirty-nine entrepreneurs, investors, and economic development officers, I 
argue that while many entrepreneurs have adjusted their business strategies to better 
match the current institutional mixture and economic realities, government policies have 
largely failed to take into account the significant changes that have occurred.  
Entrepreneurial Environments and Institutions 
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 Institutional assemblages are made up of legal rules, organizational structures, and 
behavioral norms underlie all social and economic interaction (North, 1990). All economic 
activities are constituted within and through institutional assemblages. As Martin (2000 p. 
79) argues "economic activity is socially and institutionally situated: it...has to be 
understood as enmeshed in wider structures of social, economic and political rules, 
procedures and conventions." The economic rationality that is so often considered perfectly 
natural in the business world is but itself an informal institution. The changing nature of 
these institutions, between nations, regions, and industries, helps explain the different 
economic and social practices we observe in the business world. Institutional frameworks 
shape the nature of labor reproduction and skill development and are an integral part of 
the long-term development of a nation or society (North, 1990).   
 Formal institutions, like tax regimes, legal frameworks or education systems, as well 
as organizations like trade groups, unions, and economic development agencies, create the 
competitive environment in which all businesses and actors operate in. Institutions like 
property rights and contract enforcement are fundamental to the operation of a free 
market economic system (Martin, 2000) These formal institutions are enacted by 
governments and policy makers with the goal of incentivising certain kinds of strategies or 
behaviors while discouraging others. Some formal institutions, like specialized tax breaks, 
directly influence firm strategy, while other formal institutions like educational systems, 
have a subtler affect (see Gertler, 1995). Regions with a dense structure of supportive 
formal institutions have what Amin and Thrift (1994) term ‘institutional thickness.’ This 
thickness is necessary for sustained economic growth and resilience in the face of an 
increasingly complex and global competitive environment.   
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 Informal institutions represent the socially sanctioned norms of behavior and 
informally enforced standards of conduct that are “often part of the heuristic we call 
culture” (North, 1990 p. 37). Though these institutions operate at both an industry level 
and across regions, the most important ones are local. Unlike formal institutions such as 
business regulations or financial law that enforce certain behaviors through the threat of 
legal coercion, informal institutions do not punish bad behavior as they create the context 
in which good or bad behaviors are socially defined. Adhering to the norms of informal 
institutions allow actors to build up the bonds of trust and reciprocity that underlie 
everyday economic life. 
 Informal social institutions can be seen in almost every aspect of the 
entrepreneurship process, from the first thought to start a firm to the final exit decision. 
These institutions all but forbid particular entrepreneurial actions while promoting others. 
Informal institutions create norms for risk taking, innovativeness, and tolerance of failure. 
Some communities without a history of entrepreneurship have social institutions that 
discourage entrepreneurial risk taking (Feldman, 2001). In these contexts, other actors like 
family, friends, and banks will be less willing to invest resources in a new firm because 
entrepreneurship is seen as exceptionally risky. Informal institutions relating to business 
failure are also clearly important to the entrepreneurship process. The majority of 
entrepreneurial endeavors end in failure, and the rate is even higher for risky, growth 
oriented firms (Baldwin, Bian, Dupy, and Gellatly 2000). A tolerance and even celebration 
of failure is necessary for a vibrant entrepreneurial economy (Shavinina, 2004; Aoyama, 
2009).  
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 Institutional economics, especially the New Institutional Economic popularized by 
Williamson (1985) has been criticized for viewing institutions as mere constraints on 
rational behavior and for seeing all activities through the narrow lens of transaction costs 
(MacKinnon, Cumbers, Pike, Birch, and McMaster, 2009). The older Veblenian tradition 
of institutions, along with more recent developments in institutional economic geography 
offer a richer theoretical understanding of the multifaceted role of institutions in economic 
and social life (Hodgson, 2004; Martin, 2000). From these perspectives, informal 
institutions make up the essential ‘rules of the game’ of social and economic interaction; 
they enable a multitude of actions, rather than constraining them to a few possibilities.  
Environments for Entrepreneurship 
 The right combination of formal and informal institutions, networks, and economic 
structures create what Malecki (2009) terms local entrepreneurial environments. Beneficial 
institutional, economic, and historical forces combine to create a virtuous cycle that 
supports and strengthens entrepreneurship (Julien, 2007). A critical mass of successful 
entrepreneurs helps attract entrepreneurial support services, including venture capitalists, 
accountants, lawyers, and advisers specializing in startup firms (Patton and Kenny, 2005). 
Entrepreneurial environments do more than just attract resources to a region. Over time, a 
series of visibly successful entrepreneurs in a region alter the region’s social structure and 
institutions. The successes of prominent local businesses legitimize the risks of 
entrepreneurship, encouraging both new firms and spinoff formation. Institutional shifts 
also legitimize risky investments in startups, not only by professional investors and angels 
but also by informal sources like family and friends. The increased willingness of informal 
sources to invest in startup firms helps create an ecosystem in which new firms can obtain 
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the capital necessary for protracted research and development. In a similar fashion, a local 
history of startup success stories helps create a labor pool that is willing to take the risk 
necessary to work at entrepreneurial firms.  
 The presence of mentors and angel investors are important components in 
supporting regional entrepreneurial environments. Mentors are current or former 
entrepreneurs, often in the same industry as their proteges, who provide advice and 
wisdom to the next generation of entrepreneurs (Lafuente, Vaillant, and Rialp 2007; 
Vaillant and Lafunente, 2007). They encourage new entrepreneurs to pursue high-growth 
opportunities instead of choosing slower-growing lifestyle firms. Mentors can also act as 
angels, non-institutional investors who invest very young firms. More than money, angels 
provide critical business experience and help guide entrepreneurs through the critical early 
stages of firm growth.   
Changing Entrepreneurial Institutions and Environments  
 Existing work on entrepreneurial institutions and environments are problematically 
static. While many studies carefully examine the origin and initial development of the 
institutional and cultural mixes that make up entrepreneurial environments, they have 
paid less attention to how these environments change over time in response to both internal 
and external factors. There is a poverty of dynamic theoretical frameworks on institutional 
change. While economists have examined the role of exogenous crisis in institutional 
change (see Setterfield, 1997), less has attention has been paid to the internal sources of 
institutional change. Without this, it is impossible to explain why some regions, such as 
Silicon Valley, can maintain their collaborative and resilient entrepreneurial environment 
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in the face of economic downturn, while other regions like Ottawa struggle to overcome 
similar challenges.   
 We must avoid “the constant temptation to want to ‘read off’ the individual 
behavior from national (or local) institutional structures” (Gertler, 2010 p. 5). Too often 
institutions are perceived as monolithic forces that equally influence all actors. While 
institutions structure the social and economic contexts in which firms and actors make 
their decisions, they do not force particular choices or behaviors. Actors retain significant 
freedom to experiment with new practices or strategies within the institutional limits in 
which they operate. This is especially true of entrepreneurs, who can only succeed by 
constantly experimenting with new ideas and techniques (de Clercq and Voronov 2009). 
Institutional frameworks constrain, but do not dictate, individual choice and agency. This 
freedom leads to a continual churn of new practices and ideas, successful ones are copied 
and eventually are integrated into local institutions and norms.  
 Feldman’s (2001; Feldman, Francis, and Bercovitz, 2005) study of the emergence of 
entrepreneurial institutions in Washington D.C remains the best work on the subject. She 
locates the shift from anti-entrepreneurial to more supportive institutions in the region 
through the economic shock caused by layoffs of federally-employed scientists during the 
Reagan administration. Before the layoffs, many of these scientists saw entrepreneurship 
or commercialization as “betraying scientific integrity” (Feldman, 2001 p. 866). But, 
because many of them (and their spouses) had deep ties to the community that prevented 
them from migrating to regions with more jobs, many were forced to start their own 
companies to sell back their services to the government as consultants. The success of these 
pioneering scientific entrepreneurs helped create a foundation of beneficial formal and 
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informal regional institutions that helped spur further entrepreneurial development in the 
region.  
 Entrepreneurial institutions and environments are complex social entities that react 
differently in the face economic crises. Formal institutions change very slowly due to the 
political difficulty of altering them. While informal institutions are more malleable, they 
too have substantial inertia that makes change difficult. But crises, such as the 2008 
financial crisis, can quickly disrupt informal institutions and entrepreneurial 
environments. A series of bankruptcies and the withdrawal of venture capital can devastate 
a region’s pool of entrepreneurial mentors and potential angel investors. This in turn has a 
profound affect on the region’s entrepreneurial institutions going forward. 
The Emergence of Ottawa’s Entrepreneurial Institutions  
 Ottawa — a city of 800,000 350 kilometers east of Toronto and 165 west of Montreal 
— exemplifies both how quickly entrepreneurial institutions can change as well as the 
challenges that result from mismatched formal and informal institutions. Between 1975 
and 2001, the city experienced almost thirty years of near-continuous growth in the 
telecommunications and IT sectors. This period saw the development of a set of formal and 
informal institutions that encouraged entrepreneurship and risk taking. As the internet 
evolved from an academic research project into a global industry, Ottawa's technical 
expertise in routing and networking helped the city become a hub of high-tech 
telecommunications development and entrepreneurship, a veritable 'Silicon Valley North’ 
(Shavinina, 2004)  
 However, this technical economy was damaged by the internet bubble's collapse in 
2001. Several leading companies either left the region or closed entirely because of the 
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collapse: between March 2001 and August 2003, private-sector technology jobs in the 
region declined from about 51,000 to 18,000 (Brouard, Chamberlin, Doutriaux, and de la 
Mothe, 2004). Furthermore, while Ottawa and Canada as a whole were less affected by the 
2008 financial crisis than was the United States, the region still suffered both because its 
telecommunications industry is almost entirely dependent on sales to the US as well as the 
drying up of venture capital both in the US and Canada (Corona, Doutriaux, and Mian., 
2006). These shocks fundamentally altered the entrepreneurial environment and informal 
institutions.  
 This case study is based on thirty-nine interviews with entrepreneurial actors in 
Ottawa, carried about between September and December, 2011. As part of a larger project 
studying the social foundations of Canadian technology entrepreneurship, twenty-nine 
semi-structured interviews were carried out with entrepreneurs, eight with bankers and 
institutional investors, and two with local economic development officials.1 The average age 
of the interviewed firms is 8.5 years and the entrepreneurs had lived in the region for an 
average of 22.6 years, so their views can cast considerable light on the region’s recent 
economic and social changes. Interviews were classified and coded using the Dedoose 
qualitative analysis platform. Interviews were coded using an open method that allows for 
the development of a thick description of the case study. This coding method helps achieve 
a ‘close dialog’ with Ottawa’s unique history of entrepreneurial institutions (Clark, 1998). 
                                                 
1 Entrepreneurs were randomly selected from a list of technology firms in the region. After removing non-
entrepreneurial firms, 113 firms were contacted for interviews, producing a 24.7% response rate. Because this was a 
random sampling of entrepreneurs, it is reasonable to consider this dataset as generalizable to other Ottawa 
technology entrepreneurs  
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These interviews are paired with a historical analysis of Ottawa’s economy to investigate 
the evolution of the region’s entrepreneurial institutions and environment.  
Initial development of entrepreneurial institutions  
 While Ottawa has been Canada’s capital since 1867, its economy did not diversify 
beyond the federal civil service and the pulp and paper industries for more than a century 
(Andrew, Ray, and Chiasson, 2011). However, since the 1920s the National Research 
Council (NRC), a federally funded industrial research organization, has operated 
laboratories in the Ottawa region. After the Second World War, these laboratories slowly 
began to spin-off high-tech companies that would go on to form the core of the local 
telecommunications industry. Beyond their substantial technical innovations, these labs 
served to attract a large number of highly trained scientists and technicians to the region, 
many of whom would go on to either work at or found startups.   
 Ottawa’s high tech economy emerged out of NRC research into telecommunication 
technologies in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1961, AT&T sale of it’s Canadian assets to Bell 
Canada lead to the creation of Northern Telecom, which eventually became known as 
Nortel. After a series of changes and acquisitions, Northern Telecom would became a world 
leader in advanced telecommunications infrastructure. Bell Northern Research (BNR), a 
research corporation spun out of a NRC-funded lab and eventually acquired by Nortel, 
helped create one of the most highly skilled telecommunications labor pools in the world 
during the 1970s and 1980s (Harrison, Cooper, and Mason, 2004). Nortel became anchor 
for an entire cluster of high-tech telecommunications R&D firms and government labs 
(Chamberlin and de la Mothe, 2003).  
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 The founding of Mitel by Douglas Copland and Terry Mathews in 1975 was 
particularly important to the formation of Ottawa’s entrepreneurial institutions. An early 
adopter of microprocessors in phone networks, Mitel grew quickly, going public in 1979 
before being bought out by British Telecom in 1986 (Callahan and Charbonneau, 2004). 
Both founders used their profits from the sale to start new companies: Mathews created 
Newbridge Networks, a network technology firm and Copland established Corel, a 
consumer software firm. While the mere presence of such successful companies helped 
encourage the next generation of entrepreneurs, Mathews in particular helped create an 
extremely productive entrepreneurial environment in Ottawa. His Newbridge Affiliates 
program provides young entrepreneurs with mentorship, funding, back-office support to 
help them pursue market opportunities he has identified has being important, but outside 
of Newbridge Networks’ core strategic interests (Callahan and Charbonneau, 2004). This 
program has helped start over ninety new firms, helping produce a generation of serial 
entrepreneurs in the region.  
 Organizations like the Ottawa-Carleton Research Initiative (OCRI) were 
established during this period to help foster high-tech entrepreneurship and investment. 
OCRI, first established by the city government and later spun-off into an independent non-
profit organization, helped organize the region's telecommunications industry and heavily 
promoted local technology entrepreneurship. OCRI runs educational programs for 
entrepreneurs, lobbies for government support, and attracts outside investment to the 
region. Local universities and colleges not only started specialized technical programs to 
help fill the need for a skilled labour force, they also began programs to encourage 
entrepreneurship and spin-off formation among student researchers and faculty. 
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 By the hight of the internet bubble, Ottawa’s entrepreneurial environment had 
solidified. Major firms and organizations like Nortel, BNR, Newbridge, and the NRC labs 
had attracted an educated workforce specialized in telecommunications research and 
development. While many of these employees stayed at the large firms, others, inspired by 
local institutions that encouraged entrepreneurial risk taking moved on to smaller startup 
firms. Mason, Cooper, and Harrison (2002) quote a prominent angel investor who explains 
that during the late 1990s:  
“stories [like] a young guy aged 26 who...is now a multi-millionaire and runs in a $195,000 
Porche...have become common place.  It turns everyone's head...In the past I couldn't get 
anyone out of Nortel or Mitel to join my start-ups but now I can because they feel confident 
of getting $10 million within six months as we've got the thing started.” (p. 271)  
  
 These successes were not limited to entrepreneurial firms. Nortel Networks became 
a leading, if not dominant player, in the telecommunications field during the internet 
bubble. The company served as a launching platform not only for nascent entrepreneurs 
who gained technical knowledge and business skills in the company before setting off on 
their own, it also helped to develop the region’s angel investment infrastructure. Several 
former Nortel and BNR executives and engineers founded the Purple Angels group in 2001, 
which has funded dozens of local startups. Retired Nortel and BNR engineers or executives 
commonly act as advisors to startup firms and often work with OCRI or other public 
entrepreneurial development programs.   
 Even at the hight of the bubble, Ottawa, and Canada more generally, has always 
had a deficit of local venture capitalists (Riding, 1998). Throughout much of the 1990s, only 
one or two VC firms were located in Ottawa (Mason et al., 2002). But while Ottawa has 
always been a peripheral VC market, its proximity to New York City, as well as Toronto 
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and Montreal — two of Canada’s VC hotspots — allowed entrepreneurs to tap into 
significant amounts of venture capital from outside the region. What little local VC did 
exist served to support early-stage firms while trying to attract outside investors who could 
provide larger capital injections.  
Ottawa’s Entrepreneurial Institutions at the Hight of the Internet Bubble 
 By the end of the technology boom in 2001, Ottawa had transformed from a 
government town in to one of North America’s primer high-tech regions. An 
entrepreneurial environment had grown around several core institutions. The first was a 
transformation of the region’s business culture. The success of early pioneers like Terry 
Mathews along with the more recent successes of entrepreneurs throughout the 1990s 
proved that the risk of entrepreneurship can indeed pay off. A technology economy that 
was once completely based upon government consulting, with its attendant risk-adverse 
culture and informal institutions, had now developed into a risk-tolerant, economy with 
both formal and informal institutions that firmly supported entrepreneurship.     
  Second, a decade of success, measured both by the growth of entrepreneurial firms 
along with rising stock prices at larger firms, helped create a substantial population of both 
formal angel investment groups like the Purple Angels as well as more informal angels that 
invest in firms introduced to them by their friends and colleagues. Early-stage angel 
investments prepared technology firms for rapid growth catalyzed by either subsequent 
venture investments or acquisition by larger firms. These profitable exits were critical for 
creating new generations of angels, mentors, and serial entrepreneurs.  
 Organizations like OCRI as well as specific university research programs aimed at 
the telecommunications sector represent the formal institutions that supported this 
© Spigel, B. (2011). A SERIES OF UNFORTUNATE EVENTS: THE GROWTH, DECLINE, AND REBIRTH OF OTTAWA’S 
ENTREPRENEURIAL INSTITUTIONS. In Entreprenuership and Global Competitiveness in Regional Economies: 
Determinants and Policy Implications. Emerald Green Publishing.  
 
15 
entrepreneurial environment. OCRI acted both to support new entrepreneurs through 
training and attract outside investment for existing firms. From its beginning, OCRI has 
been oriented towards supporting the region’s telecommunications industry, and only later 
branched out to other sectors and other forms of entrepreneurship. OCRI was 
instrumental in helping the two local universities expand their engineering programs to 
support the a skilled labor force and market-oriented research and spin-off activity. These 
university programs served to educate a workforce specialized in telecommunications 
technology and to produce basic and applied research relevant to the R&D needs of local 
firms.  
Decline and reemergence of Ottawa’s technology economy 
 Ottawa's entrepreneurial economy was battered by the collapse of the internet 
bubble. While the city's economy has largely recovered, its entrepreneurial environment 
and institutions were fundamentally altered. Because Ottawa’s historical specialization in 
the telecommunications sector, it profited handsomely as global computer networks were 
built out throughout the 1990s. When the internet bubble collapsed in 2001, the region’s 
firms found themselves overextended and overvalued. Numerous firms failed during this 
period due to the evaporation of sales and investment opportunities. Nortel, the region’s 
dominant firm, found itself uniquely exposed to the precipitous decline in network 
equipment purchases. The decline in sales, combined with strategic missteps by the 
company’s leadership, led to a decade of deterioration that eventually resulted in the firm’s 
bankruptcy and liquidation. From 2000 to 2002, global employment at Nortel dropped 
from a peek of 94,000 to 37,000. 10,000 of these lost jobs were located in Ottawa alone 
(Nortel, various years; Brouard et al, 2004).  
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The changing nature of entrepreneurship 
 The decline of Nortel and other large telecommunications firms did not spell the end 
of technology entrepreneurship in Ottawa. To the contrary, while Nortel shed 61% of its 
global labor force between 2000 and 2002, the number of technology firms in Ottawa 
increased by 25% over the same period (Statistics Canada, various years). While there was 
a significant drop in technology workers in 2004 and 2005, the population of skilled 
technical workers soon recovered. Even during the worst of the crash, the number of high-
tech firms in Ottawa continued to increase.  
 The continued increase in technology firms despite the ongoing downturn in the 
technology is not surprising given the socially embedded nature of entrepreneurship. Much 
of Ottawa’s technical labour force was and still is made up of people who moved to the area 
to take a job at large organizations like Nortel or the federal government. While they may 
have been drawn to the city for their jobs, many quickly became enamored of the city’s 
high quality of life. When these workers lost their jobs at larger organizations, they faced a 
choice of either looking for a new job locally, difficult, given the declining economy and 
bureaucratic nature of government hiring, or leaving the region in search of a new job, 
which entailed uprooting their family and abandoning their networks of friends and 
colleagues. Technical workers with high levels of human capital and in-demand skills had a 
third option: they could choose to start their own firms to support themselves while 
remaining in the Ottawa.  The workers did necessarily not aspire to be entrepreneurs, but 
were rather forced into it by circumstances beyond their control. 
 A larger problem that significantly changed the nature of Ottawa entrepreneurship 
after the internet bubble was the almost complete disappearance of VC. The pullout of VC 
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from the region hurt the angel community in two ways. First, angels who had invested in 
companies that subsequently received investments were lost money when venture 
capitalists engineered quick exits from their investments. Venture capitalists often 
negotiated senior debt rights that diluted the ownership of both the founders and early 
angel investors. In many cases, venture capitalists were guaranteed a specific profit from 
their investment, meaning that in these situations entrepreneurs and angel investors did 
not profit from a sale or IPO.  Calahan and Charbonneau (2004) argue that because of 
these actions “most [angels] have left the scene permanently and the fragile angel networks 
that had been built up over the preceding 20 years have been significantly weakened” (p. 
194). The pullout of VC from Canada was exacerbated by the 2008 financial crisis, which 
significantly weakened the US dollar. Because many Canadian VCs act as conduits for 
American venture investments, this drove up the cost of cross-boarder investing. 
Currently, there is only one venture capital firm headquartered in Ottawa, and they are no 
longer actively investing in new firms.    
 Many angels were damaged by venture capitalists’ sudden exit. Any profits the 
angels would have made through the exits were largely wiped out by the debt structure. 
Furthermore, few of investments that survived this period have paid off for the angels . 
Even nine years after the initial crash of the telecommunications market, Ottawa based 
angels still have less available capital to invest in new firms. In the words of one local angel 
investor:     
The angel community in town, the word I could use to describe it is tired. There’s a lot of 
angels that made lots of investments over the last 10 or 15 years, not a lot of it is paid back 
yet. A lot of those investments still look really good but they’re still investments, not 
returns. So there’s a lot of people waiting on the sidelines now saying ‘I’ve put a lot of 
money into this and I’m going to wait until I get some return before I jump back into the 
pool.’ (Interview O125) 
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 Another independent angel investor spoke of a recent investment in a company that 
went public after receiving venture capital: “I was one of the first 25 investors in that. 
When it IPO’ed I was underwater as well. I was sitting there going: you’d think that if you 
were the first angel investor and the first person working there and someone IPO’ed, you 
should have a success, this is your home run.” (Interview O107) Consequently, the number 
of active angels in the regional economy has precipitously declined.  
 The second consequence of the pullout of venture capital was to reduce the number 
of future angel investors. The lack of angel investment over the past decade has 
significantly reduced the overall number fast-growing entrepreneurial firms. 
Entrepreneurs depend on angel investors and venture capitalists to support their early 
research and product development as well as the advice angels provide and the legitimacy 
their investment signals. Without these benefits, it is hard for new firms to grow to a point 
where the founder earns enough to act as an angel or role model. Thus, the pull out of VC 
from the region had a double affect on the angel environment: existing angels largely 
stopped investing in new firms, which in turn reduced the numbers of new angels in the 
local economy. 
Adaption to new institutional environments  
    Both major crises of the 21st century — the end of the internet bubble in 
2001/2002 and the 2008 financial crisis — changed the institutional context of 
entrepreneurship in Ottawa. All actors in the city’s entrepreneurial environment have had 
to adapt their strategies and practices in response to these new institutional assemblages. 
Two institutional changes are especially important: The first change was in the structure 
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and institutions of the local angel investing and venture capital scene. Second was a shift in 
local, informal institutional norms away from growth-oriented entrepreneurship and 
towards lifestyle entrepreneurship. While entrepreneurs have adapted to this new 
environment, local policies and organizations like OCRI have not fully embraced this new 
business reality, limiting their overall effectiveness.   
 Entrepreneurs have generally adjusted to the new investment landscape. One angel 
investor noted that “[i]n 2002/2003, people still thought they’d get money to build large 
systems. Now it’s getting smaller and smaller, people’s expectations are getting smaller and 
smaller. Now most people are trying to build software companies that they can build on a 
shoestring.” (Interview O125) Growth-oriented entrepreneurs are now explicitly choosing 
strategies to compensate for the lack of available angel or venture capital. A popular 
strategy in Ottawa to manage the lack of available angel or venture investment is a 
Software as a Service (SaaS) revenue model, where programs are leased or rented to 
clients. This provides a stable stream of revenues instead of traditional software sales that 
depend on new versions to generate income. Several entrepreneurs using this strategy cited 
the lack of angel or venture capital as the primary reason for choosing it over a more 
traditional product-based strategy. One serial entrepreneur remarked that during the 
early years of his second firm “We were going through ‘x’ number of years without really 
making any money. So we kind of bootstrapped...there was no investor at the time...that 
was willing to back a new software startup company with zero revenues. So in hindsight I 
actually think that was fantastic because it really focused the company on if we want to 
survive we’d better as hell get some revenue coming in here.” (Interview O120)     
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 The absence of angel or venture capital has caused many growth-oriented 
entrepreneurs to adjusted their exit strategies. Without outside investment, it is difficult for 
firms to grow to the size where either acquisitions or IPOs are feasible. These types of 
exists provide the founder and other early employees and investors the wealth that can 
support future entrepreneurial endeavors. Without this, many entrepreneurs expressed an 
interest growing their first company to where it generates sustainable revenues. At this 
point, they can essentially ‘fire’ themselves and use a portion of the firm’s reoccurring 
revenues to support another startup or endeavor. For instance, the founder of an education 
technology firm expressed his desire to “...direct a movie, that would be my ultimate goal. 
So what I want to do is that in 3 to 5 years not be actively running the company but having 
somebody else running it and I would be probably owning the majority of it but not 
actively involved.” (Interview O126)  
 However, this shift towards organic growth and SaaS stratagies, as well as a 
simultaneous shift to software companies that had fewer fixed startup costs, decreased the 
usefulness of local competencies in telecommunications and networking technologies. The 
talent attracted to Ottawa by Nortel and the NRC labs specializing in telecommunications 
technology are not necessarily well matched for this new breed of software firms. Many 
former Nortel engineers are used to a corporate mode of development and organization 
that is quite different from that of entrepreneurial startups. One serial entrepreneur 
argued that:  
“ all those [former Nortel] engineers went out into the engineering pool of the city and they 
found themselves at lots of startups. But one of the problem is that having already been 
trained in one methodology of development, it makes it difficult for us to hire them for two 
reason. One is that they ask for too much money and two because the startup way is a lot 
more agile when it comes to developing applications. We don’t have meetings upon 
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meetings to talk about things. We have meetings to present things that we’ve developed.” 
(Interview O119)   
 
 A similar problem exists for the local angel investment community. Many of the 
entrepreneurs who are considering approaching angel investors made it clear that besides 
the capital investment, they wanted an angel who was familiar with their product and 
industry and could effectively advise them. Many of the local angels are former Nortel or 
BNR engineers or managers, and have highly specialized knowledge about networking 
technologies and markets. As the new generation of software entrepreneurs moves beyond 
the telecommunications sector, existing angel investors are become less and less able to 
offer effective advising and mentorship.  
The lifestyle turn  
 The most visible change in Ottawa’s technology economy over the past decade has 
been the shift in informal entrepreneurial institutions away from supporting growth-
oriented entrepreneurship and towards emphasizing lifestyle entrepreneurship. This 
reflects a desire among many new entrepreneurs to spend less time growing their firm into 
an international leader, and instead dedicate more of their energy to outside pursuits. This 
change is not simply the outcome of a decade of economic crisis and entrepreneurial 
malaise, but rather reflects broader changes in the social nature of entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurs, investors, and local economic development officials concede that since 
Nortel’s collapse there has been a marked change in the outlook and goals of new small 
business owners. The leader of a successful entrepreneurship training program observed:  
[There is a] big difference between 2002 and 2009. In 2002 you had the guys who were 
going to grow organically and the guys who were going to go VC and so they’ll make 
money through the VC sale... In 2009 I don’t see any of those [later] guys. I haven’t seen 
one guy. Most of it is the lifestyle, the realization that for me to make $150,000 a year the 
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job that I want isn’t here in Ottawa anymore, I don’t want to leave Ottawa because it’s a 
wonderful place to live in and my wife doesn’t want to leave Ottawa and my kids don’t 
want to leave Ottawa and so I’ve got to create income for myself and I want to do it using 
my entrepreneurial skills – so it’s lifestyle. The people in there – it’s all lifestyle. (Interview 
O135) 
 
 Ottawa is a particularly good location for skilled workers to start their own lifestyle 
firms. The federal government is a massive consumer of IT consultants and contract 
workers. Entrepreneurs can either create their own firm and pursue government contracts 
or they can become freelance consultants working for the government through a 
contracting agency. However, the government tendering and procurement process is 
exceptionally complicated, several interviewees reported that it took them years before they 
could effectively apply for government contracts. Beyond the federal government, large 
firms in the area increasingly contracted out as they laid off their technical support staff. 
One interviewee, a former Nortel employee who left the company to start his own IT 
consulting firm, used his connections still in the company to get contracts to provide 
technical services back to the company. While small firms based around government and 
corporate contract work are sustainable, their growth potential is limited to the hours they 
can bill. 
 A major question is why the majority of these workers who were forced into 
entrepreneurship by the end of the internet bubble largely opted to form slow-growing 
lifestyle firm instead of fast-growing gazelles. There is some evidence that truly growth-
oriented entrepreneurs left the city during the early stages of the crash of the technology 
economy. These entrepreneurs were likely unmarried or childless and had fewer ties to the 
region, enabling them to move to regions like Toronto or Vancouver that had more 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Those that stayed behind did so because they had deeper 
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connections to the region, ether because their family, spouse, or children prevented moving 
or their own preference for Ottawa's quality of life. Lacking other job prospects, many 
turned to entrepreneurship to support their current standard of living.  
 Entrepreneurs who started their own firms at this time entered a market much 
different from the one that existed during the internet bubble. Demand for new 
technologies or products dried up, limiting opportunities for product-based companies. 
Many entrepreneurs found that consulting was the only viable option.  Newly laid off 
technical workers chose to start consulting firms because they have very low capital 
requirements and barriers to entry, and have the added benefit of generating revenues 
almost immediately. This is important, since only some of the laid off workers received 
severance packages. Others relied either on their savings, their partner’s wages, or credit 
card debt to support them during the startup period. However, despite the ease of starting 
a consulting firm, many of the entrepreneurs interviewed professed that running a business 
required very different skills than working for a larger company. Several entrepreneurs 
explained that learning to network with potential clients was particularly challenging, as 
one laid-off Nortel worker who started his own consulting firm said: “Some people are 
really gifted at networking and meeting people and chatting, and that’s not really been my 
strength.” (Interview O108),    
 The slow growth of many of these firms is not only due to the constraints of 
consulting, but rather because many of the founders have no desire to be growth-oriented 
entrepreneurs. Growth-oriented entrepreneurship demands an incredible level of attention 
and time and distracts the founder from their family and outside interests. Lifestyle 
entrepreneurs explicitly chose particular strategies that allows them to find a more 
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preferable work/life balance. For instance, an entrepreneurial husband and wife team 
choose to layoff most of their employees because they found that managing them became 
frustrating. When asked what the greatest challenge the firm has ever faced, this 
entrepreneur responded “getting the goddamn programmer to do his job,” adding that 
having to manage people made him “an employee of my own company.” (Interview O103)   
 Because of both the growth limits of consulting firms along with some 
entrepreneurs’ own decisions to limit firm growth, very few lifestyle entrepreneurs will 
ever reach a point where they can act as mentors or angel investors to other entrepreneurs. 
This has profound implications for the future development of Ottawa’s informal 
entrepreneurial institutions. A continuing lack of role models and mentors who exemplify 
the rewards of growth-oriented entrepreneurship means that fewer new entrepreneurs will 
exceptional growth as an achievable goal. Successful entrepreneurship contributes to 
institutions that not only convinces other potential entrepreneurs that the risk of both their 
time and money may pay off, it also affects other potential entrepreneurial actors, such as 
the entrepreneurs’ family and other investors, to take on the risk as well. Without these 
entrepreneurial institutions, it becomes harder for the region to sustain the growth-
oriented entrepreneurial community that is so critical to endogenous regional economic 
growth.     
 This is not to say that Ottawa no longer has growth-oriented high-tech 
entrepreneurs. The emerging SaaS cluster demonstrates that new entrepreneurs in the city 
still dream of creating large firms with the possibility of a very profitable exit. The 
majority of entrepreneurs in any region will invariably be lifestyle entrepreneurs and 
Ottawa is no exception to this rule. But, without question, the proportion of growth-
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oriented entrepreneurs has declined in the region since the end of the internet bubble. As 
argued above, the lack of new, prominent, successful entrepreneurs in Ottawa over the past 
decade has altered the region’s informal institutions. The lack of informal institutions that 
promote growth-oriented entrepreneurship does not mean that there will be no growth-
oriented entrepreneurs, but rather it suggests that fewer will chose such a path when 
presented with an entrepreneurial opportunity.     
Informal and Formal Institutions 
 Neither OCRI nor research programs at the local universities have successfully 
adapted their programs to serve Ottawa's new generation of software entrepreneurs, and 
instead still focus on telecommunications entrepreneurship and research. These formal 
institutions continue to serve an economy that in many respects no longer exists; while 
Ottawa still has a telecommunications cluster, it is far smaller than it once was. This means 
that the local universities are producing fewer trained workers that have the skills the new 
generations of small software firms need and there is less useful academic knowledge that 
can spillover into local firms. This is not to say that government organizations are 
incapable of responding to institutional change, but rather political decisions were made 
for these programs to continue to focus on the remaining local telecommunications 
economy, rather than on the new forms of entrepreneurship that have emerged organically. 
Formal institutions are less adaptable than informal ones because of the need for political 
consensus and buy-in from multiple stakeholders. 
 Several software entrepreneurs felt that OCRI's programs were not useful for their 
particular industry, that as one entrepreneur puts it: “they still had this notion...that chips 
and wires and cables were going to come back. They just didn’t see the potential for the 
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kind of businesses that have sprung up where ...3 people can get together with minimal 
capital and have a startup. They were still thinking in terms of millions of dollars.” 
(Interview O116) Another software entrepreneur agreed, saying: “the majority of the 
associations in the city were built around the telecom boom. Which really says very little 
software startups, especially small ones like us. What we’ve done because of the lack of 
support in that space is we’ve created our own.” (Interview O119)  
 OCRI did react quickly to the initial downsizing of large firms like Nortel by 
helping newly laid off workers transition to entrepreneurship. However, their programs 
and strategies reflected a clear desire to replicate the old growth-oriented entrepreneurship 
in order to replace the jobs lost to downsizing. Events and classes focused on attracting 
venture capital and planning for IPOs and acquisition exists. These programs are designed 
to help growth-oriented entrepreneurs who need help accessing venture investments. But, 
in the wake of the earlier VC pullout and the 2008 financial crisis, this is essentially no 
longer an option for many entrepreneurs. While OCRI does operate an entrepreneurship 
center, it is geared towards very small businesses like restaurants or commercial 
contractors. Software entrepreneurs of course benefit from some of the services it provides, 
such as how write a basic business plan or file for a federal tax ID, but it cannot help them 
with issues that even small software firms will face, like the challenges of working with 
foreign customers or managing a very unstable cash flow.    
Conclusion 
 Ottawa’s entrepreneurial economy experienced a decade of turmoil. Technology 
entrepreneurship boomed during the internet bubble, with large firms like Nortel 
attracting skilled workers from across Canada and the world to Ottawa. Around this 
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economic success, a set of supportive formal and informal entrepreneurial institutions 
emerged, helping to form a highly successful entrepreneurial environment. These 
institutions helped encourage many to take on the risk of entrepreneurship, by either 
starting a company themselves, leaving a large firm to work at a startup, or investing in a 
new firm.  
 The two economic crises of the last decade, the end of the internet bubble and the 
2008 financial crisis, fundamentally changed this environment. The first crisis devastated 
the market for telecommunications technologies, forcing entrepreneurs to find other 
markets. The sudden pullout of venture capital from the region not only hurt those firms 
that had taken it, but also damaged an entire local network of angel investors and other 
informal investors. This crisis also precipitated the downfall of several of the city’s largest 
technological employers. Many laid off workers turned to entrepreneurship as a way to 
stay in the region. However, many of them turned to a different kind of entrepreneurship, a 
form of entrepreneurship that allowed them to preserve time for their family and other 
pursuits at the cost of firm growth and expansion. This choice is related to larger changes 
in local informal entrepreneurial institutions that now cautioned against risk taking. This 
crisis contributed to the decrease in the number of new angel investors and entrepreneurial 
role models in the city, further hurting local entrepreneurial institutions.  
 The 2008 financial crisis had fewer immediately visible consequences for the city’s 
technology economy, but this crisis continued to damage key entrepreneurial institutions. 
The strengthening Canadian dollar has meant that Ottawa has largely been unable to 
participate in the revitalized American venture market. This, combined with the lack of 
active angel investors left after the internet bubble has caused the remaining growth-
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oriented entrepreneurs in to embrace growth strategies that do not require outside capital. 
This in turn has contributed to an increasing focus on sustainable organic growth, largely 
through SaaS strategies, that will allow the entrepreneur to eventually ‘fire’ themselves 
from a profitable company to work on another startup. These changes are summarized in 
Table 1. 
[table 1 around here] 
 It is important to note that while these institutional changes are path dependent, 
they are not deterministic. Despite Terry Mathews’ continued success as an entrepreneur, 
investor, and mentor, his presence alone did not prevent an institutional shift towards 
lifestyle entrepreneurship over the past decade. Therefore, while the sources of institutional 
change may be external, the institutional change itself occurs through the actions of 
individual actors and as a result of individual agency. Individual entrepreneurs made 
particular choices, such as the choice to pursue a growth-oriented firm or a SaaS strategy, 
based on their own particular circumstances, goals, priorities, and wider views of the 
economy. These choices are both influenced by the institutional assemblage they exist 
within as well as ultimately affecting those institutions based on their successes or failures. 
When considering institutional change, we must look beyond the causes and carefully 
examine the nature and process of the change.  
 These changes reflect shifts in the social institutions that underlie Ottawa’s 
entrepreneurial environment. The informal institutions changed quickly in response to the 
shifting economic conditions. Social institutions that once encouraged entrepreneurs to 
take on the risks needed to quickly grow an entrepreneurial firm now seem to support 
slower, less risky strategies. The same cannot be said for the city’s formal entrepreneurial 
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institutions. These are still firmly directed towards a telecommunications sector that is no 
longer a regional economic engine. Because these formal institutions are tied to larger 
political forces in the city and province, they cannot change as quickly as informal ones. In 
cases like Ottawa, this leads to a mismatch between the formal and informal institutions; 
the formal institutions are no longer aligned with the underling informal institutions.  
 Effective government policies must work in tandem with local informal institutions. 
While some policies, such as a ban on non-compete agreements, favorable tax policies, and 
educational investments, can contribute to a thriving entrepreneurial environment, these 
policies only create change on the margins. While they may help some entrepreneurs, they 
are unlikely to be very beneficial. Instead, policies should seek to identify informal 
institutions and social elements already present in the community and strive to work in 
concert with them. Entrepreneurial environments are fundamentally social systems that 
cannot be wholly created or sustained by government action alone. Rather than trying to 
create entrepreneurial clusters or new industries from nothing, policy makers must seek to 
build on existing regional advantages. The social norms, conventions, and rules that make 
up informal institutions compose a powerful source of regional advantage that policy 
makers should seek to harness.  
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Table 1 - Summary of Institutional Changes over time 
 During internet bubble 
(1990-2001) 
Post internet bubble 
(2001-2008) 
Post financial crisis 
(2008-present) 
Role of venture 
capital 
Used to finance quick firm 
growth, many firms make 
explicit strategic decisions 
to bring on VC 
Many firms damaged by 
quick pullout of VC, forced 
into early sale or IPO. 
Initially after bust, many 
firms still pursuing VC, but 
less willing to change firm 
strategy to take it on 
Most entrepreneurs now 
believe that it is very difficult 
and undesirable to take on 
VC. Many adjust strategies 
in order to grow without 
outside capital.   
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Presence of angel 
investors  
Entrepreneurial and 
corporate successes create 
network of formal and 
informal angels who invest 
in local firms. Angels are 
able to use their telecom 
expertise to advise firm and 
help prepare them for quick 
market growth and eventual 
VC investment. 
Existing angels are harmed 
by sudden VC pullout. 
Angels either lose their 
investment, make no profit, 
or their investment periods 
are significantly increased. 
Many choose to stop actively 
investing or cease being 
angels entirely. Angels are 
still able to effectively advise 
the telecommunications 
firms they invest in. 
The lack of very large and 
profitable exists over the past 
decade results in fewer new 
angels to replace those who 
have left.Angel’s 
telecommunication 
experience less relevant. 
Entrepreneurs increasingly 
look for strategies that 
produce organic growth. This 
increases the downward 
trend of local angel 
investing.      
Growth-oriented 
vs lifestyle 
entrepreneurship 
While lifestyle 
entrepreneurship is always 
a widespread, the visible 
success stories at this time 
convince many that growth-
oriented entrepreneurship is 
feasible and desirable. 
Many leave stable 
employment at large firms 
to start or work at startups.   
Many laid off technical 
employees turn to 
entrepreneurship as an 
alternative to migration or 
reduced income. However, 
these new entrepreneurs are 
much more interested in 
striking a work/life balance 
than previous generations, 
and therefore many of them 
choose to start low-capital, 
lifestyle firms.  
Given the lack of recent 
success stories or mentors, 
the trend towards lifestyle 
entrepreneurship continues. 
Entrepreneurs who are 
genuinely interested in 
starting growth-oriented 
firms must either leave the 
region or adapt to the lack of 
available angel and VC 
financing.  
Preferred exit Many growth-oriented 
entrepreneurs are primarily 
oriented towards large 
exists through either IPOs 
or acquisitions. The legacy 
of success stories like Mitel 
and Nortel demonstrate that 
this is very possible.   
Initially, despite a shrinking 
of the telecommunications, 
many entrepreneurs still 
seeking large exit via 
acquisition. As 
telecommunications bust 
continues, many begin to 
readjust their goals.   
Entrepreneurs increasingly 
aware that a large exit is no 
longer possible. They begin 
to choose strategies that 
allow for long-term 
sustainable revenues. Some 
express a desire to use these 
revenues to help form new 
startups.  
Role of OCRI OCRI serves to lobby for 
local telecommunications 
industry. Helps establish 
targeted research programs 
at local universities and 
attracts outside investment 
and capital.  
OCRI organizes 
entrepreneurship training 
classes for laid-off 
telecommunications workers. 
The primary goal is to 
continue local growth-
oriented entrepreneurship.  
OCRI has largely not 
adapted to the new informal 
entrepreneurial institutions in 
the region. Several software 
entrepreneurs complain 
about OCRI’s continued 
focus on the 
telecommunications industry.  
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